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Winston: Evidence - The Impotence of Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404 in Crime

EVIDENCE-The Impotence of Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404 in Sex
Crime Trials: Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987).
After a trial by jury in the Third Judicial District Court Walter Brown
was found guilty of incest in violation of Wyoming Statute section
6-4-402(a). 1 The trial court admitted into evidence testimony of the victim's half-sister, Kate Brown. Kate testified that Walter Brown had sexual intercourse with her before the charged incident of August 1985.2 Kate
could not state precisely when the prior acts of incest took place but testified that the last had occurred in 1979 when she was twelve years old.'
Although defense counsel objected to admission of this other bad acts
evidence as a violation of Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404, the trial court
admitted Kate Brown's testimony for the purpose of showing: motive,
modus operandi, continuing scheme or plan and to corroborate the victim's testimony.4 These are recognized purposes for the admission of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts under Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404(b). Walter
Brown included the trial court's disposition of his evidentiary objection
as an issue on appeal.'
The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's admission of
other bad act evidence. However, the court did not attempt to support
all four of the trial court's purposes for admission. It based its affirmance
solely upon the admissibility
of the evidence to show Walter Brown's mo6
tive to commit incest.
BACKGROUND

7
Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404 is identical to its federal counterpart.
In relevant part Rule 404 provides that:

a) Character Evidence Generally
Evidence of a person's character or trait of his character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on any particular occasion, except:
b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts
1. WYO. STAT. § 6-4-402 (1977, Rev. 1983).
a) A person is guilty of incest if he knowingly commits sexual intrusion, as
defined by W.S. 6-2-301(a)(vii), or sexual contact, as defined by W.S.
6-2-301(a)(vi), with an ancestor or descendant or a brother or sister of the whole
or half-blood. The relationships referred to herein include relationships of:
i) Parent and child by adoption;
ii) Blood relationships without regard to legitimacy; and
iii) Stepfather and stepchild.
b) Incest is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5)
years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or both.
2. Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110, 1111 (Wyo. 1987).
3. Record at 349, 350, Brown, 736 P.2d at 1110 (No. 7-335).
4. Id. at 385.
5. Brown, 736 P.2d at 1111.
6. I at 1113.
7. Because Wyo. R. EVID. 404 is identical to the federal rule, Wyoming finds federal
cases addressing this rule persuasive. Brown, 736 P.2d at 1111 n.1.
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Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.
Rule 404(b) is a component of a meticulously drafted body of rules 8
that have one ultimate purpose: to guide the trial court to a truthful and
efficient resolution of conflicting factual contentions.9 In furtherance of
this goal the Rules of Evidence state that evidence tending to make the
existence of a fact to be proved more or less probable is relevant, and as
such is generally admissible.'0
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that when the fact
to be determined is whether or not the accused committed a criminal act,
evidence that the accused has committed very similar acts cannot be said
to be irrelevant." Since the defendant's predilection to commit crime is
relevant, a rule requiring its exclusion seems contrary to the purpose of
the Rules of Evidence as a whole."2 This superficial conflict is resolved
by the underlying policy of Rule 404(b). This policy, as articulated by the
8. S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974). In recommending passage of bill
H.R. 5463 to establish uniform rules of evidence in federal courts, the Senate Judiciary Committee gave background on the formation of the rules. "H.R. 5463 is the culmination of 13
years of study by distinguished judges, Members of Congress, lawyers and others interested in and affected by the administration of justice in the Federal courts." AL
9. Wyo. R. EvID. 102 is identical to FED. R. EVID. 102. Both state: "These rules shall
be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustified expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." Wyo. R. EvID. 102; FED. R.
EvD. 102.
10. Wyo. R. EviD. 401 is identical to FED. R. EVID. 401. Both state: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." Wyo. R. EvwD. 401; FED. R. EVID. 401.
Wyo. R. EVID. 403 is identical to its FED. R. EvID. 403. Both state: "Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighted by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations, of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Wyo. R. EVID.
403; FED. R. EvID. 403.
11. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
The state may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime.
The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on contrary, it is
said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge
one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against
a particular charge. (footnotes omitted).
1d
12. Id at 476 n.9.
The truth is, this part of our law is an anomaly. Although, logically speaking,
it is quite clear than an antecedent bad character would form quite as reasonable
a ground for the presumption and probability of guilt as previous good character
lays the foundation of innocence, yet you cannot, on the part of the prosecution, go into evidence as to bad character.
Id (citing Reg v. Rowton, 10 Cox's Criminal Cases 25, 29-30 (1865)).
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United States Supreme Court, 13 is that evidence of the accused's propensity to commit crime is not excluded because it is irrelevant. Rather, the
evidence is excluded due to its effect upon the jury.
For almost three hundred years courts have recognized the undesirable influence propensity evidence has upon the jury, and have required
its exclusion.' 4 More recently in United States v. Burkhart,the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated the policy concerns that prompted Rule
404(b). 15
But, perhaps the unfair prejudice produced by propensity evidence
is best understood in human terms. Courts and commentators 16 have
shown an awareness to the visceral reaction we all feel when confronted
with another who has committed reprehensible crimes. A prior bad act
may have little probative value regarding the crime charged; but bolstered
by emotion its significance is heightened and may dwarf the more rational evidence of the case. At the turn of the century Professor Wigmore identified the tendency of other crimes evidence to foster the perception that
the defendant is an evil man. The jury then may become vengeful wishing to punish the defendant in spite of rather than based on the evidence
of the case.'7 Contemporary authorities in the field of evidence have recognized that admission of evidence that the accused has committed acts that
are profoundly similar to the crime charged allows the jury to draw the
inference that because the defendant has committed a similar crime he
also committed the crime charged.'8 This is the propensity inference that
Rule 404 prohibits.
These influences distort the jury's perception of the evidence in the
prosecution's case-in-chief. Therefore the jury's ability to correctly resolve
13. Id at 475; see also FED. R. EviD. 404 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 56
F.R.D. 183, 220 (1973) ("While its basis lies more in history and experience than in logic
an underlying justification can be fairly found in terms of the relative presence and absence
of prejudice in the various situations.").
14. 1 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 194 (3d ed. 1940) ("[Flor nearly three centuries, ever
since the liberal reaction which began with the Restoration of the Stuarts, this policy of exclusion, in one or another of its reasonings, has received judicial sanction, more emphatic
with time and experience.").
15. United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201, 204 (10th Cir. 1972). Three reasons were
given why courts are reluctant to admit other crimes evidence. First, the accused is required
to face charges not included in the indictment. Second, prior crimes testimony has the
predominant quality of showing the defendant as a generally bad man. Showing that a man
is generally bad has never been allowable in our system. A man has a right to be tried on
the truth of the specific charge. Third, once evidence of prior crimes is introduced the trial
is for all practical purposes over, the guilty verdict follows as a mere formality. This is true
regardless of the caution employed in instructing the jury. Id
16. See, e.g., State v. Saltarelli, 655 P.2d 697, 699 (Wash. 1982); Gregg, Other Acts
of Sexual Misbehaviorand Perversion as Evidence in Prosecutions for Sexual Offenses, 6
Auiz. L. REV. 212 (1965); Note, Evidence of Defendant'sOther Crimes: Admissibility in Minnesota, 37 MINN. L. REV. 608, 614 (1953); Note, Other Vices Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REV.
325, 333-34 (1956).

17. 1J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 194 (1904).
18. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE,

§

140, at 199 (1985); United States

v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("To tell a jury to ignore the defendant's
prior convictions in determining whether he or she committed the offense being tried is to
ask human beings to act... well beyond mortal capabilities.".
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the factual issues of the case is diminished.1 9 The exclusion of propensity
evidence helps preserve the probity of the trial by preventing the inaccuracy that results from its admittance. 0 Rule 404(b) furthers the ultimate goal of the Rules of Evidence: that truth will be ascertained and cases
justly determined.
Wyoming has developed an approach which differentiates the application of this rule on the basis of the type of crime involved. In particular, a rule of per se admissibility in sex crime cases is now firmly
established.
The genesis of Wyoming's rule of per se admissibility is found in
Strand v. State2 1 where the defendant was charged with the rape of his
daughter. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's admission of evidence which showed other acts of sexual intercourse between
the defendant and his daughter. 2 The court stressed that the evidence
could only be considered for the purpose of showing defendant's "lustful
disposition and intent." 2
24
The next Wyoming case addressing the issue was State v. Quirk.
There the defendant appealed his conviction for statutory rape of his
daughter. 25 The defendant contended that his daughter's testimony concerning prior acts of sexual intercourse with the defendant was improperly
admission of the evidence to corroborate
admitted. The court affirmed
26
the testimony of the victim.
In State v. Koch, 7 the defendant was convicted for having carnal
knowledge of a girl who was under the age of eighteen. The victim was
the defendant's step-daughter. On appeal the defendant contended that
the step-daughter's testimony of previous acts of sexual intercourse between herself and the defendant was admitted in error. Citing Strand and
Quirk the court disagreed, ruling the evidence permissible to prove identity, corroboration of the testimony and the relation and intimacy of the
parties. 2 However, the court admonished the prosecutor for his opening
statement in which he announced that he would prove the defendant was
guilty of sexual intercourse with another young girl. The court noted that
such declarations were wholly improper in this case. 29 The trial court had
already ruled that evidence of the defendant's prior acts with a girl other
19. Burkhart, 458 F.2d at 204.
20. FED. R. EvrD. 403 advisory committee's note ("The case law recognizes that certain circumstances call for the exclusion of evidence which is of unquestioned relevance. These
circumstances entail risks which range all the way from inducing decision on a purely emotional basis at one extreme, to nothing more harmful than merely wasting time, at the other
extreme.") reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 218 (1973). See also Burkhart, 458 F.2d at 204.
21. 36 Wyo. 78, 252 P. 1030 (1927).
22. Id at 85, 252 P. at 1032.
23. Id
24. 38 Wyo. 462, 268 P. 189 (1928).
25. Id at 464, 268 P. at 190.
26. Id
27. 64 Wyo. 175, 189 P.2d 162 (1948).
28. Id at 183, 189 P.2d at 164.
29. Id at 196, 189 P.2d at 170.
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than the victim was inadmissible. But, because the defendant did not raise
the issue on appeal the court declined to order a reversal."0
This line of cases clearly established that in the context of sexual
offenses, defendant's other similar acts were admissible if they involved
the victim in the charged offense.3
Elliott v. State3 2 considerably expanded the admission of other sexual acts evidence to include defendant's other sex acts with a third party.
Elliott involved a prosecution for second degree sexual assault. The defendant was the victim's step-father. At trial, the victim's older sister was
allowed to give testimony that she had been sexually assaulted by the
defendant prior to the crime charged. On appeal the defendant contested
the admissibility of the older sister's testimony. The court affirmed, noting that in cases involving sexual assaults, statutory rape, and incest,
the majority of jurisdictions have allowed the admission of defendant's
admissible
similar acts with third parties.33 The court held such evidence
34
for the purpose of proving the motive of the defendant.
Justice McClintock concurred specially, agreeing that the testimony
of the victim's sister was admissible. However, he could not agree that
the testimony established a motive for the crime. Instead Justice McClintock found the evidence to5 be admissible to establish a continuing plan
or characteristic method.

Since Elliott, the motive purpose of Rule 404(b) appears to have become an open door through which other sex acts evidence is consistently
allowed to enter in Wyoming's sex crime trials. In Vasquez v. State,3" the
defendant appealed his rape conviction on the grounds that evidence of
his prior rape of the victim was admitted in error. The court disagreed,
affirming the trial court's reliance upon the Elliott rationale that prior
acts of similar sexual conduct are probative 3of7 defendant's motive, and
can establish a particular course of conduct.
The court used similar reasoning to decide the case of Evans v. State.38
Evans, the appellant, was found guilty of sexual assault in the first degree.
At trial a woman other than the victim gave testimony that she had been
raped by the appellant one year before the charged sexual assault took
place. Appellant contended that such evidence was admitted in error. The
court began its analysis by quoting from United States v. Oliphant 9 for
30. 1&

31. Elliott v. State, 600 P.2d 1044 (Wyo. 1979).
32. Id. (It is interesting to note that John D. Troughton the Attorney General successfully representing the State in Elliott, was the trial court judge in Brown v. State).
33. Id at 1048, compare C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190, at 558-61 (1972) (The author
observes that cases involving other crimes evidence are "as sands of the sea" but notes that
only "a number of jurisdictions now admit other sex offenses with other persons".).
34. Elliott, 600 P.2d at 1048.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id at 1050.
623 P.2d 1205 (Wyo. 1981).
Id. at 1208.
655 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 1982).
525 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1975).
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the proposition that where there exists a striking similarity between the
charged crime and the prior acts, the evidence is admissible as relevant
to a common scheme, system or design. However, the court went on to
quote from Elliott,eventually reaching the conclusion that the sexual assaults were sufficiently similar to be relevant to appellant's motive.40 Beginning with Elliott, the Wyoming Supreme Court has used the motive
exception to 404(b) as a beam to bridge the gap between admitting evidence of the defendant's other sex acts with the victim and admitting evidence of the defendant's sex acts with third parties. Wyoming's faith in
the strength of this beam is demonstrated by the court's reliance upon
it in subsequent decisions.
PRINCIPAL CASE

Brown v. State reaffirmed the Elliottrationale of admitting the defendant's other sexual misconduct in sex crime trials. But, in contrast to Elliott the court did not merely follow the lead of other jurisdictions to arrive
at a decision. Rather the court explained the reasoning behind its use of
the motive exception to Rule 404. The factual backdrop of Brown provided the court with an opportunity to expound its view on the use of the
motive exception in sex crime trials. The trial court had allowed into evidence the testimony of the victim's half-sister who testified that Brown
had sexual intercourse with her before the alleged incestuous incident for
which Brown was on trial."1
In a plurality opinion written by Chief Justice Brown, joined by Justice
2
the court approved the admission of other sex acts to show
Thomas,'
defendant's motive to commit incest. The court based its holding upon
three grounds. First,
Incest involves aberrant sexual behavior-it is a type of sexual deviancy that is difficult to understand. Therefore, a trier of fact
might well wonder what would motivate the accused to behave
in such a bizarre manner. The evidence of prior sexual acts then
the motive exception because of the unusual
was probative under
43
behavior involved.
Second, the court reasoned that "[i]f the accused had a predilection
to deviant sexual practices with young female relatives, it would not be
unreasonable for the trier of fact to determine that he had a motive to
commit the acts complained of by the victim in this case."44
Third, evidence of other sexual acts was admissible to show that, because the older sister was unavailable, the accused was motivated to incest with the present victim.' 5 The court went on to state that this ap40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Evans, 655 P.2d at 1219.
Brown, 736 P.2d at 1110.

I
Id at 1113.
Id
Id
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plication of the motive exception was consistent with the rule established
in Elliott.
Justice Cardine provided the third vote for affirmance in a special concurrence, agreeing with Justices Brown and Thomas on the admissibility
of the other sex acts evidence. However, he expressed concern that no
clear rule of law had been established to determine when other bad act
evidence is, or is not, admissible. Addressing the problem, Justice Cardine
would require that courts assess the relevancy of the evidence, balance
prejudice against probative worth and determine that the evidence is
offered for a legitimate purpose."6
In dissent, Justice Urbigkit criticized the court's view on admission
of other sex acts to show the defendant's motive. He believed that the
court had simply redefined motive as disposition, inclination or propensity; in other words, bad character. ' Justice Urbigkit reemphasized his point
by calling for motive to be distinguished from propensity or inclination, 8
so that convictions are based on guilt, not character. 9 His criticism
proceeded to distinguish all of the authorities cited by the majority with
the exception of Elliott. Though Justice Urbigikit recognized that the
majority's opinion was consistent with the precedent set in Elliott he expressed his disagreement with the rationale of that case. He pointed out
that Rule 404(b) is a general rule of evidence, which contains no exception for sexual assault cases. 50Because he could find no support for such
an exception, he therefore found Elliott to render Rule 404(b) meaningless and was unable to adhere to stare decisis. 1 Emphatically reflecting
a similar point of view, Justice Macy's complete dissent is as follows: "I
to Rule 404, W.R.E.,
dissent. This case has just struck the final death blow
2
and all that remains is the spirit of the rule."5
ANALYSIS

In sex crime trials, Wyoming has consistently allowed evidence of a
defendant's other sex acts to be admitted under the motive exception of
Rule 404(b). This approach, as applied in Brown, has three inherent flaws:
First, the court's reasoning in applying the motive exception defeats the
purpose of Rule 404(b) by allowing the jury to hear criminal propensity
evidence. Second, the court is affirming admission of evidence where the
danger of unfair prejudice outweighs probative value. Third, routine admission of propensity evidence can deny the accused a fair trial in violation of the United States Constitution's fourteenth amendment.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id
Id
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

1117 (Cardine, J., concurring).
1119 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
1124.
1119.
1125.

at 1128 (Macy, J., dissenting).
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The Purpose of Rule 404(b)
The court's reasoning in applying the motive exception allows the jury
to hear propensity evidence, which can produce decisions based upon the
forbidden propensity inference, and emotion rather than reason. The court
gave three reasons for admitting the contested evidence under the motive exception. Notwithstanding these three reasons the court allowed the
jury to hear forbidden propensity evidence in a sex crime trial. The first
basis for admission stresses that incest involves aberrant behavior that
is difficult to understand. Other acts of similar behavior are then admissible to explain the defendant's motive for such behavior. 3 The rationale
behind the first basis allows invariable admission of the accused's other
sex acts in sex crime trials. Where the accused is charged with a crime
involving unusual sexual behavior, then acts of similar behavior are admissible. The court reasoned that the unusual nature of the other sexual
acts provides the jury with a reason why the accused committed the crime
charged.54 The logic seems clear: because Brown had sexual intercourse
with his step-daughter he was likely to be motivated by an appetite for
sex with very young girls. Therefore he was more likely to have had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. This argument describes the propensity inference that Rule 404(b) was drafted to preclude.15
The court's reasoning finds that the more unusual the sexual aberration involved, the more rarely will it manifest itself in observable behavior.
Therefore evidence of prior incidents of similar behavior tend to show a
heightened probability that the accused committed the aberrant crime
charged. The relevance of prior similar acts evidence is therefore increased. 6 What the court's reasoning fails to recognize is that the danger
of the jury drawing the forbidden propensity inference is markedly heightened by the similarity of the sexual behavior involved.57 Where the accused is charged with a crime of deviant sexual behavior, evidence of other
similarly bizarre acts may lead the jury to too readily accept that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. The jury then unfairly prejudges the
accused, in essence robbing him of the presumption of innocence.6 8
53. Id at 1113 (majority opinion). See supra quoted material in text accompanying note
43.

54. Brown, 736 P.2d at 1113. Motive supplies "the reason that nudges the will and
prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent." United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898,
912 n.15 (1978) (quoting Slough & Knightly, Other Vices Other Crimes, IOWA. L. REv. 325,
328 (1956)).
55. Ali v. United States, 520 A.2d 306, 311 (D.C. App. 1987). The appellant's conviction for sexual assault was reversed and remanded because other crimes evidence was improperly admitted. The evidence that appellant had unlawful sexual contact with the younger
sister had only one logical inference, that because the defendant had done so with the younger sister he must also have done so with the prosecutrix. This is precisely the inference
of propensity forbidden. Id.
56. See Wyo. R. EVID. 401 (which defines "relevance"). "Where evidence sought to be
introduced is an extrinsic offense, its relevance is a function of its similarity to the offense
charged." United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S.
920 (1978).
57. See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 140, at 191 (1985).
58. State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954).
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Rule 404(b) does not prohibit propensity evidence because it is irrelevant, rather it is the distractive effect upon the jury that unfairly
prejudices the defendant and requires the exclusion of such evidence."
The court's reliance upon the shared unusual nature of prior acts and the
crime charged in no way lessens the fact that the jury is diverted from
consideration of the particular crime before them. The jury must determine the defendant's guilt of the particular crime charged. It must not,
however, convict him on the basis of other acts unrelated to the crime
charged. Indeed the defendant may have paid the price for previous crimes
and should not be subject to prosecution for them a second time.6
In Brown, the court's second justification for admitting evidence of
other bad acts rests upon a misinterpretation of Rule 404(b) which equates
propensity with motive."1 The court read the rule as allowing other bad
acts evidence to show the accused's propensity for sexual deviance. Havthat the acing once established propensity the jury is free to determine
62
cused had a motive to commit the crime charged.
The court cited no jurisdiction which similarly interprets Rule 404(b).
Neither is this interpretation supported by the plain language of the Rule
nor the purpose behind its enactment. The language of Rule 404(b) explicitly prohibits the admission of other bad acts to prove the character
of a person in order to show he acted in conformity with that character.
However, other bad acts evidence may be admitted for anotherpurpose,
such as to show motive. The Rule prohibits the admission of evidence to
show the defendant's criminal propensity. Other bad acts evidence canupon which the
not be admitted to first show the accused's propensity,
63
accused's motive will then be derivatively based.
An example of the proper use of other acts evidence to establish motive, contrasted with Wyoming's application, may be illustrative. In a
prosecution for mailing threatening letters to a policeman, evidence that
the policeman had previously issued three speeding tickets to the defendant was properly admitted to show defendant's motive for threatening
the policeman. 64 Suppose instead, the defendant had previously been con59. See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 136, at 129-30 (1985) ("fEvidence law labors under the ambivalent conviction that prior crimes evidence is relevant to
prove conduct, but that the jury cannot be trusted to put the evidence in the proper perspective.").
60. Appellant unsuccessfully presented a double jeopardy argument. Brown, 736 P.2d
at 1113. This is a separate issue and is not discussed in this casenote.
61. Id at 1113. See supra quoted material in text accompanying note 44.
62. Brown, 736 P.2d at 1113 ("If the accused had a predilection to deviant sexual practices with young female relatives, it would not be unreasonable for the trier of fact to determine that he had a motive to commit the acts complained of by the victim in this case.").
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY,

2nd College Ed. (1983), defines predilection as: "A

disposition in favor of something." Id. at 976. Propensity is defined as: "An innate inclination or bent." I& at 943. While not wishing to engage in semantics it seems safe to assume
that Rule 404(b) prohibits both propensity and predilection evidence.
63. United States v. Bowman, 720 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Evidence of prior

crimes is admissible whenever relevant to an issue other than the defendant's criminal
propensity.").
64. United States v. Goehring, 585 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1978).
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victed of mailing threatening letters. Wyoming would allow admission of
the prior conviction because "[i]f the accused had a predilection to [mailing threatening letters], it would not be unreasonable for the trier of fact
to determine that he had a motive to commit the acts complained of in
this case. '""
In the real case, evidence of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the speeding tickets did establish a reason why the defendant wrote
the threatening letters. But in the hypothetical, propensity is established
and a motive is then said to be derived from that propensity, even though
the prior acts evidence fails to illuminate in the slightest the defendant's
reason for writing threatening letters to the policeman. Clearly, Wyoming's interpretation eviscerates the rule of all its significance by distorting the meaning of motive.
The purpose of Rule 404(b) is (1) to prevent the conviction of an accused because he is a "bad man" who deserves to be punished, not because of the crime charged but because of prior or subsequent misdeeds,
and (2)to preclude the inference that because he has committed other
crimes he is more likely to have committed the crime for which he is
charged .6 Or in general terms, to prevent the jury from unfairly prejudging the accused.6' The court's approach, which first requires proof of
propensity from which a motive is derived, compromises the purpose of
Rule 404(b). Once the propensity evidence is admitted the prejudicial effect occurs. This effect is not ameliorated simply because the jury may
derive a motive from that showing of propensity.
The court's third reason for admitting Kate Brown's testimony rests
upon a presumption of the accused's propensity for incest. The court held
the other crimes evidence was admissible to show that the accused was
motivated to incest with the victim because the older daughter was unavailable. 8 This reasoning loses all validity unless it is presumed that the
accused has a propensity for incest. The inference is that because Walter
Brown desired sexual intercourse with Kate he was inclined towards incest with the victim. This inference is logically suspect and legally abhorrent. Bearing in mind that Kate was an adopted daughter, does it follow
that because Walter Brown had intercourse with her he was also inclined
towards intercourse with Kathy, his natural daughter? Even if the inference had some factual validity, it is still precisely the propensity inference that Rule 404(b) prohibits. 9
Improper Balancing
Brown demonstrates that the court is affirming admission of other
bad acts evidence where the danger of prejudice outweighs probative value.
65.
stituted
66.
67.
68.
69.

Brown, 736 P.2d at 1113. The words "mailing threatening letters" have been subfor the words "deviant sexual practices" in the cited opinion.
Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 245 (Wyo. 1984).
Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475-76.
Brown, 736 P.2d at 1113.
Ali, 520 A.2d at 311.
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Such errors in the balancing process are especially damaging to the jury's ability to determine the validity of the specific allegations against
the defendant.
The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 404(b) requires that once other
bad acts evidence is offered for a permissible purpose the determination
must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence. 70 Acknowledging the complexity and discretionary nature of the trial court's determination, it is nevertheless clear
that the Brown decision affirmed a balance which incorrectly weighed the
competing values of probative worth and prejudice.71
The balance between probative worth and prejudice is influenced by
many considerations. A major factor in the balance is the prosecutor's
need for the particular proof. The less the need for the evidence the more
the balance tips towards excluding prejudicial evidence. The extent to
which the particular matter is in issue, and the extent to which the eviare primary components of
dence is necessary to resolve that matter,
2
prosecutorial need for the evidence.1
In Brown, the accused's motive was not in dispute. He did not contend that he had no motive for incest, his defense was that the act of incest did not take place at all. Where prior acts evidence does not go to
evidence weighs
an important issue of the case, prejudicial effect of such
7
more heavily in the balance than probative value. 3
Furthermore, it was unnecessary for the state to introduce evidence
of prior bad acts to show Brown's motive for incest. In People v. Honey,74
the Colorado Supreme Court considered the necessity of using prior bad
acts to show motive. The court held that where motive or intent are to
be inferred from commission of the act itself and the prior act indicates
no aspect of intent that cannot be discerned from the act in the instant
case, then evidence of the prior act is unnecessary to show the intent or
motive of the defendant in the case in question. 5
If Brown's motive for having sex with his daughter could be discerned
from the act itself, then other crimes evidence would be unnecessary.
70. FED. R. EvID. 404 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 221 (1973).
71. Brown, 736 P.2d at 1113. "Evaluating the evidence in this case in light of our previous decisions and decisions from other courts as well, we cannot say that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of evidence of prior acts of sexual misconduct

involving appellant." Id.
72. 2 D. LoUISELL & C.

MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 140, at 199 (1985). See also
United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1057 (5th Cir. 1981) (the court stated that in mak-

ing the balance between probative value and prejudice, the need for the evidence is an important factor to be considered).
73. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
920 (1978).

74. 596 P.2d 751, 755 (Colo. 1979).
75. Id. See also Fallen v. United States, 220 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 924 (1955) (the court held that where proof of the criminal act carries with it the
implication of motive, evidence of other like crime is not needed to establish motive and is
not admissible for such purpose).
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Because the evidence is not needed, the danger of it unfairly prejudicing
the defendant outweighs its probative worth.
A Missouri appellate court decision supports the position that the motive for incest can be discerned from commission of the act itself. In State
v. McElroy," the defendant appealed his conviction for incest on the
ground that prior crimes evidence was improperly admitted. The trial court
had permitted a daughter other than the alleged victim to testify that
McElroy had sexual contact with her and had threatened incest. 7 7 The
Missouri Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence failed to
conform to any of the exceptions to the rule excluding other crimes evidence.7 8 Regarding relevancy to motive, the court held that motive and
intent for incest are inherent in commission of the crime itself. Evidence
of similar acts with a person other than the prosecutrix could not be admissible to show the accused's motive for incest with the prosecutrix. 9
Along similar lines is State v. Ramirez" where the Washington Court
of Appeals recognized that the state's need to prove the defendant's purpose for committing an illegal sex act is a function of how readily that
purpose can be inferred. Where the jury can infer that an act was committed for the purpose of sexual gratification, then other sex acts evidence
is unnecessary and inadmissible to prove this purpose. 81 The reasoning
of the Missouri and Washington appellate courts applies equally well to
Brown. It was unnecessary for the state to present other crimes evidence,
which had a high risk of undue prejudice, to show defendant's motive for
incest.
Another important element of the balance between prejudice and
probative value is the nature of the other acts evidence. Some crimes are
more likely than others to produce emotional reaction and the concomitant risks of prejudice. 8 In sex crime cases the risk of prejudice is at its
highest." The act of incest is even more likely to influence the jury's emotions, so much so that it feels compelled to punish the defendant for his
other crimes. There also exists the fiction, often passed off as simple intuition, that incest offenders are more likely to be habitual or compulsive
offenders.84 This assumption,though erroneous," tempts the jury to a decision based upon a propensity inference.
Experts in the field of evidence have voiced concern that the courts
are finding ways to make other crimes evidence fit the motive exception
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

518 S.W.2d 459 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
Id. at 461-62.
Id.
Id.
46 Wash. App. 223, 730 P.2d 98 (1986).
Id. 730 P.2d at 101.
82. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL

EVIDENCE,

83. State v. Saltereli, 655 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1982).

§

140, at 199 (1985).

84. Gregg, OtherActs of Sexual Misbehaviorand Perversionas Evidence in Prosecutions for Sexual Offenses, 6 ARIz. L. REV. 212 (1965).
85. Grunfeld & Noreik, Recidivism Among Sex Offenders, 9 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY
95 (1986).
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to Rule 404(b) without making the required balance between evidence's
probative value and prejudicial effect.
[11f judges, trial and appellate, content themselves with merely
determining whether the particular evidence of other crimes does
or does not fit into one of the approved classes, they lose sight
of the underlying policy of protecting the accused against unfair
prejudice. The 6policy may evaporate through the interstices of the
classification.1
The Wyoming Supreme Court's approach to admitting other crimes
evidence in sex cases accentuates the validity of such concerns. Kate
Brown's testimony of intercourse between herself and Walter Brown was
unnecessary to show Walter Brown's motive for incest, yet the likelihood
of the testimony producing unfair prejudice was extreme. The failure to
recognize this gross imbalance sets a damaging precedent. It can only
diminish the jury's ability to accurately determine the accused's culpability for the particular crime charged.
The Fourteenth Amendment
Routine admission of propensity evidence brings the basic integrity
of Wyoming's sex crime trials into question and may deny the accused
a fair trial in violation of the United States Constitution's fourteenth
amendment. Evidentiary rules are generally matters of state law for state
legislatures to enact and state courts to interpret.87 Therefore evidentiary
errors do not usually raise issues of federal constitutional significance.
However, an evidentiary scheme which routinely allows other crimes evidence to be admitted may violate the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.88
The United States Supreme Court has previously acknowledged the
effect of propensity evidence upon the trial, holding that propensity evidence may deny the accused a fair opportunity to defend against the crime
charged. 9 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has likewise recognized that
erroneous admission of other crimes evidence affects the "fundamental
fairness" of the trial itself.90 In a previous decision the tenth circuit held
that denial of a fair trial is also a denial of due process demanded by the
fourteenth amendment. Failure to afford the accused those protections
required by the fourteenth amendment renders a trial and criminal conviction illegal and void.9
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the constitutional
ramifications of other crimes evidence admitted in error. While the court
of appeals could formulate no precise guidelines, it stated that where the
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190, at 453 (2nd ed. 1972).
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
United States v. Pate, 426 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 995 (1970).
Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476.
United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201, 205 (10th Cir. 1972).
Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942).
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probative worth of relevant evidence is greatly outweighed by prejudice
to the accused, then admission of the evidence may deny the accused fundamental fairness and due process of law.2
The foregoing authorities indicate that the trial court's admission of
other crimes testimony was not merely an evidentiary question and therefore a matter of state law. Rather the error may have so prejudiced Walter
Brown's defense that a violation of the fourteenth amendment is implicated.
CONCLUSION

In Brown v. State, the court set a troubling precedent. When the
court's reasoning is followed by the district courts, other crimes evidence
will be virtually admissible per se, in sex crime trials. There is a danger
that these trials will deny the accused the fundamental fairness that forms
the basis of our judicial system. The reasoning set forth in Brown should
therefore be re-examined by the court. A greater awareness of the need
to insulate the trier of fact from propensity evidence is required. In this
way the rights of those accused of sex crimes will receive much needed
support.
HAYDN WINSTON

92. Pate, 426 F.2d at 1083.
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